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Attorneys for Hecla Limited
BEFORE THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFrH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF TWIN FALLS

lnReCSRBA

Subcase No. 91-7755, et al.

Case No. 49576

HECLA'S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

COMES NOW, Hecla Limited ("Hecla"), by and through its attorneys ofrecord, Barker
Rosholt and Simpson LLP, and submits this reply in support of its Motion for Summary Judgment.
Hecla's summary judgment motion was directed at the off-reservation instream flow claims. This
reply addresses those claims, without waiving the arguments raised in response to the United States'

and Tribe's motions concerning the other types of water rights claimed by the United States on
behalf of the Tribe. For the reasons explained herein, judgment should be granted in favor of the
State and Hecla.
INTRODUCTION
These off-reservation instream flow claims asserted by the United States are unabashedly
claims for instream habitat off the reservation, or as the United States describes it, a "biological"
water right. If granted, the United States' and Tribe's off-reservation instream flow claims would
impose an environmental servitude on all off-reservation waters and water users by controlling
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the water supply. This is undisputed by the United States and Tribe. In fact, they essentially
admit to this goal. The United States and Tribe try to downplay this reality - contending that they
are not controlling the water, but that the water will simply be administered in priority like all
other water rights. Make no mistake, these off-reservation federal reserved water rights impact
all junior water right holders in the basin - upstream and downstream. The Tribe demands the
most senior water rights in off-reservation waterways to protect their recently discovered
"biological" right for the protection of fish habitat in these off-reservation streams. As a matter
of law, these claims fail. The Agreements between the United States and Tribe reserving the land
do not even purport to preserve any right or any claim outside of the Reservation and this Court
cannot rewrite those Agreements in the manner demanded by the United States and Tribe.
Choctaw Nation ofIndians v. United States, 318 U.S. 423,432 (1943) ("Indian treaties cannot be
re-written or expanded beyond their clear terms to remedy a claimed injustice or to achieve the
asserted understanding of the parties"); Choctaw Nation ofIndians, supra; see also United States
v. Choctaw Nation, 179 U.S. 494 (1900) ("the Court cannot employ any "notion of equity or
general convenience, or substantial justice," to "incorporate into an Indian treaty something that
was inconsistent with the clear import of its words").
The Court must carefully analyze these demands for federal reserved water rights under
the Winters Doctrine, because to grant these claims will give the United States senior rights in
the system and the unprecedented ability to control the water supplies. It is because of this reality
that the Winters Doctrine has been exercised only within the narrowest boundaries and only
when necessary to secure the "primary purpose" of the reservation of land. Cappaert v. United
States, 426 U.S. 128, 139 (1976) ("In determining whether there is a federally reserved water
right implicit in a federal reservation of public land, the issue is whether the Government
intended to reserve unappropriated and then available water. Intent is inferred if the previously
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unappropriated waters are necessary to accomplish the purposes for which the reservation was

created.") (emphasis added). Indeed,
Congress, in giving the President the power to reserve portions of the federal
domain for specific federal purposes, impliedly authorized him to reserve
"appurtenant water then unappropriated to the extent needed to accomplish the
purpose of the reservation." While many of the contours of what has come to
be called the "implied-reservation-of-water doctrine" remain unspecified, the

Court has repeatedly emphasized that Congress reserved "only that amount
of waler necessary to f ulf,1/ the purpose ofthe reservation, no more." Each
time this Court has applied the "implied-reservation-of-water doctrine," it has

carefully examined both the asserted water right and the specific purposes
for which the land was reserved, and concluded that without the water the
purposes ofthe reservation would be entirely defeated.
United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696, 701 (1978) (emphasis added); see also Cappaert,

426 U.S. at 143 (''the implied-reservation-of-water-rights doctrine is based on the necessity of

water for the purpose of the federal reservation") (emphasis added).
The United States and Tribe do not dispute that the Tribe ceded "all right, title and claim"
outside the Reservation. Nevertheless, they argue that they have the right to control offreservation instream flows based on a nebulous "homeland" theory. They assert that, since the
Reservation was identified as the "home" for the Tribe, the Tribe is entitled to all water rights
that they now think are necessary to support a "homeland." Neither Winters nor any other case
supports such a right. Rather, a reserved water right can only be based on the "primary purpose"
of the Reservation. Merely identifying the Reservation as a "homeland" does not give rise to a
right to control habitat or the water supply outside that reservation. The Court may only find
reserved water rights for those purposes that are consistent with the "primary purpose" of the
Reservation. 1

1 The United States and Tribe quote some cases that refer to a reservation as a "home" or "homeland." U.S. Resp. at
Part II.A; Tribe Resp. at Part ll. Yet, many of these cases still conducted a "primary purpose" analysis. See, e.g.,
Coleville Confederated Tribes v. Walton, 641 F.2d 42 (911, Cir. 1981) (''We apply the New Mexico test here," which
states that water reserved must be "necessary to fulfill the very purposes for which a federal reservation was
created"); United States v. Adair, 723 F.2d 1394 (9th Cir. 1983) (an Indian reservation may have more than one
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The United States and Tribe have not demonstrated that the primary purposes of this
Reservation would be "entirely defeated" without a right to control off-reservation instream
flows for biological purposes. State v. United States (In Re SRBA Case No. 39576). 134 Idaho
940, 946 (2000) ("In order to meet the test of necessity required for a federal reserved water
right, the need for water must be so great that, without water, the primary purpose of the
reservation will be entirely defeated"). They have not, because no such evidence exists.
Likewise, neither the Tribe nor the United States have shown that these off-reservation instream
flow claims are appurtenant to the Reservation lands. Agua Caliente Band o/Cahui/la Indians v.

United States,_ F.3d _ , 2017 WL 894471 (9th Cir., Mar. 7, 2017) at •4 (the Winters
doctrine "only reserves water if it is appurtenant to the withdrawn land")2; Cappaert v. United

States, 426 U.S. 128, 138 (1976) (reserved water right doctrine "reserves appurtenant water then
unappropriated"). 3 Given the utter failing to show that these habitat claims are appurtenant to the
Reservation, the United States' and Tribe's claims must be denied.

"primary purpose" but still conducting a primary purposes analysis); Order on Motions for Summary Judgment of
the Stale ofIdaho, /da}w Power, Potlatch Corporation, Irrigation Districts and other Objectors who Have Joined
and/or Supported the Various Motions, Cons. Subcase No. 03-10022 (Nov. 10, 1999) (the "Nez Perce Order")
(primary purposes analysis applies in Idaho). In Walton, while recognizing that the reservation was a "homeland for
the Indians," the Court still conducted a "primary purpose" analysis to detennine the intent of the reservation. 647
F.2d at 47-48. This analysis emphasizes that merely labeling a reservation as a "home" or "homeland" does not
answer the question of the "primacy purpose" of the reservation. Such "homeland" theory, as demanded by the
United States and Tribe, is inconsistent with Ninth Circuit precedent. United States v. Washington 375 F. Supp. 2d
1050, /065 (W.D. Wash. 2005) (rejecting a tribe's claim for water for a "homeland purpose" as "contrary to the
''primary purpose" doctrine under federal law). The only case identified that includes a "homeland" analysis by the
Arizona Supreme Court. In re General Adjudication of all Rights to Us Water in the Gila River System & Source, 35
P.3d 68 (Ariz. 200 I). Given the vast case law in Idaho from the U.S. Supreme Court requiring a "primary purpose"
analysis, this case is not persuasive authority.
2 The Agua Caliente Court also detennined as a matter of first impression that a tribe had a federal reserved water
right to groundwater. 2017 WL 894471. That case arose in vastly different circumstances. The reservation was in
the arid southern California desert. The surface water was insufficient for the needs of the reservation. None of
those facts are duplicated here.
3 The Tribe recognizes that the "reservation of water must be appurtenant to the reservation ofland," but concludes
that there is no requirement that the water be located within or adjacent to the reservation. Tribe Resp. at 34-36; see
also US Resp. at 67 (accusing State of conflating the "term 'appurtenant' with adjacency or physically touching a
water source''). The United States and Tribe confuse the nature of"appurtenant water" with an "appurtenant water
right." See U.S. Resp. at 52 (ignoring the distinction and concluding "the United States is trust owner of allotments,
as well as appurtenant reserved water rights") (emphasis added). The State explains the distinction in its Reply
Brief. State Reply at Part C.
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LEGAL ARGUMENT

I.

The Nez Perce Order Provides Guidance for this Court's Decision.
The Order on Motions for Summary Judgment ofthe State ofIdaho, Idaho Power,

Potlatch Corporation, Irrigation Districts and other Objectors who Have Joined and/or
Supported the Various Motions, Cons. Subcase No. 03-10022 (Nov. to, 1999) (the "Nez Perce
Order"), provides important guidance for this Court's decision. In light of the Nez Perce Order,
a "careful examination"4 of the record demonstrates that the Tribe did not retain the right to
control off-reservation instream flows. Noticeably, but for a dismissive footnote in the Tribe's
response brief, Tribe Resp. at 71, n.21, both the United States and Tribe continue to ignore this
decision and its application to these claims. The decision is very important because it was issued
by this Court, addresses the identical issue - off-reservation instream flows - and holds that a
tribe that specifically retained off-reservation fishing rights (unlike the Coeur d'Alene Tribe) did
not have a federal reserved water right.
A.

The Nez Perce Order Rejects a Claim to Reserved Instream Flows for Fishing
Rights.

In the Nez Perce Order, the Court concluded that a reservation of fishing rights at
locations off the reservation "in common with" the citizens of the United States does not
constitute a reservation of a water right or the right to control instream flows. Nez Perce Order at
31-33. Through the Nez Perce Treaty, the tribe agreed to cede alt "right, title and interest"
outside their reservation - except that they expressly retained the "right of taking fish at all usual
and accustomed places in common with the citizens of the territory." Id. at 27. The United States

• New Mexico, supra at 701 ("Each time this Court has applied the 'implied-reservation-of-water doctrine,' it has
carefully examined both the asserted water right and the specific purposes for which the land was reserved").
(Emphasis added).

HECLA'SREPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

5

and Nez Perce asserted that this language reserving fishing rights implied a right to control the
instream flows of the river to "protect" their "in common" fishing right. Id. at 12-13. This Court
rejected the United States and Nez Perce Tribe's contention - concluding that:
Simply put, the Nez Perce do not have an absolute right to a predetennined or
consistent level of fish. In times of shortages, the Supreme Court noted that it
may be necessary to reallocate proportionate shares to meet the subsistence or
ceremonial needs of the Tribe. Consequently an implied water right is not
necessary for the maintenance of the fishing right as it has been defined by the
Supreme Court.

Id.; see also id. at 36, citing Nez Perce Tribe v. Idaho Power Co., 847 F.Supp. 791 (D. Idaho
1994) ('1he Tribe does not have an absolute right to the preservation of the fish runs in their
original 1855 condition, free from all environmental damage caused by the migration of
increasing nwnbers of the settlers and the resulting development of the land"). 5
The Agreements with the Coeur d'Alene Tribe do not reserve any fishing rights.6 Much
less one "in common" with the citizens. Here, rather than retain any off-reservation fishing
rights (of any kind), the Tribe ceded "all right, title and claim" outside the Reservation. There is
no limit to the scope of this cession- all was ceded. If the right to fish off-reservation, as
expressly retained in the Nez Perce Treaty, does not create any right to an off-reservation

5 This is e:w:tly what the United States is arguing in these claims - i.e. a right to preserve fish runs in their original
condition. As a party to the proceedings resulting in the Nez Perce Order, the United States is estopped from
disputing that decision. See Western Industrial & Env. Services, Inc. v. Kaldveer Assoc., Inc., 126 Idaho 541, 544

(1994).

The United States relies on the decisions in Wash. Dep 't. ofEcology v. Acquavella, No. 77-2-01484-5 (Wash.
Super. Ct. Sept. l, 1994) ("Acquavella f'), and Wash. Dep 't. ofEcology v. Acquavella, No. 77-2-01484-5 (Wash.
Super. Ct. Sept. I, 1994) ("Acquavella If'). However, these decisions do not support a claim for off-reservation
instream flows. Both cases addressed a treaty that provided off-reservation fishing right "in common with" the
settlers of the territory and the "usual and accustomed places." Jd. Importantly, the court recognized that there were
"two types of fishing rights" provided in the treaty - exclusive on-reservation fishing and "in common with" offreservation fishing. Acquave/la I, supra at 10. The discussion ofinstream flow rights recognized by the court were
specifically in reference to the "in common with" off-reservation rights. Id. at 8-9. Speaking to the off-reservation
fishing right retained by the tribe, the court held that there was a right to "an amount [of water] necessary to
maintain fish life in the Yakima River." Since these cases and any similar cases involving off-reservation instream
flow claims to support enumerated fishing rights are contrary to the Nez Perce Order, they should not be followed.
As the Supreme Court has held, "decisions of lower federal courts are not binding on state courts, even on issues of
federal law." Dan Wiebold Ford Inc. v. Universal Computer Consulting Holding, Inc., 142 Idaho 235,240, 127
P.3d 138, 143 (2005).
6
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instrearn flow water right, then it defies logic to assert that any implied right to fish onreservation would create such a water right off the reservation.
Tribal members undoubtedly fished in some of these off-reservation waterways. Some
Tribal members likely fish in the Reservation's waterways today. Fishing was no doubt part of
their pre-reservation lifestyle. However, these facts do not justify a finding that the United States
and Tribe intended to impose an environmental servitude on all off-reservation waters and water
users in order to sustain any fishing practices within the Reservation. The evidence is directly to
the contrary.
The Tribe contends that it only ceded "land" and not the usufructuary rights associated
with that land. Tribe Resp. at 52-55. They rely on the Supreme Court decision in Minnesota v.

Mille lacs Band ofChippewa Indians, 526 U.S. 172 (l 999), for the premise that, since their
1887 and 1889 Agreements did not mention water rights, they did not relinquish any claim to
off-reservation instrearn flows. E.g. Tribe Resp. at 54. Mille lacs does not support the Tribe's
argument.
In Mille Lacs, an 1837 treaty ceded all lands outside the Indian reservation, and expressly
reserved the "privilege of hunting, fishing and gathering the wild rice" upon the ceded lands. 526
U.S. at 177. The Court held that a subsequent Executive Order and a treaty- which was silent
about the off-reservation hunting and fishing guaranty - did not relinquish the right to hunt and
fish off the Reservation. Id. at 198 ("It is difficult to believe that in 1855, the Chippewa would

have agreed to relinquish the usufructuary rights they had fought to preserve in 183 7 without at
least a passing word about the relinquishment"). This is because "the Chippewa's usufructuary
rights under the 183 7 Treaty existed independently ofland ownership." Id. at 201. Therefore, the
cession of additional reservation land had no effect on the usufructuary right on ceded land
because there was no language extinguishing that right.
HECLA'S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY 1UDGMENT
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In this case, the Coeur d'Alene Tribe ceded "all right, title and claim" outside the
Reservation. They did not reserve any right to hunt or fish in the ceded area. In ceding land, the
Tribe did not reserve, and the United States did not recognize, any hwiting, fishing or water
rights appurtenant to land outside of the Reservation. As this Court has held, even if a Tribe, like
the Mille Lac Chippewa, had a usufructory right to hunt and fish off the Reservation (which the

Coeur d' Alenes do not have) it would not give rise to a federal reserved water right. Nez Perce
Order, supra.
Mille lacs and the Nez Perce Order demonstrate that Congress knew exactly how to
preserve rights of Tribes to use resources off the Reservation. It did so by expressly
acknowledging those rights. Otherwise, the Agreement to cede "all right, title and interest"

means exactly what it says. There is no exception for fish habitat or a "biological" water right in
this Treaty with the Coeur d'Alenes.
The Tribe's claim that only land was ceded by the Treaty with the United States, and that
there is an wilimited usufructory right off the Reservation that gives right to a water right runs

i

I

head long into both the reserved water rights doctrine and the diminishment case law. A federal
reserved water right is implied when there is a reservation of land, Winters, supra; Avondale

Irrigation Dist. v. North Idaho Properties, 99 Idaho 30, 34, 577 P.2d 9, 13 (1978) (when the
federal government reserved land it reserves right to appurtenant water necessary to accomplish
the purpose of the reservation ofland); Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128, 136 (I 976).
Since the water right must be appurtenant to land, when the land was ceded, so too was any
claim to a water right. Second, ceding "all right, title and interest in the lands" is "precisely
suited" to diminishrnent of the reservation and termination of tribal rights outside that boundary.

South Dakota v. Yankton Sioux Tribe, 522 U.S. 329, 344 (1998); Wyoming v. EPA, 2017 WL
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694481, _

F.3d _

(10th Cir. Feb. 22, 2017). Hence, the Coeur d'Alene Tribe have ceded all

right, title and interest to land and appurtenant water rights in the off-reservation lands.
The United States cites Mille Lac only to support its claim that the Supreme Court
"sharply limited" its decision in Oregon Department ofFish and Wildlife v. Klamath Indian

Tribe, 473 U.S. 753 (1985). In ODFW v. Klamath, that Tribe had no off-reservation rights and
only retained on-reservation usufructory hunting and fishing rights. Id. When the Reservation
was diminished again in 1901, the on-reservation rights were extinguished as well because there
was no reservation left to exercise those rights in. Id. Mille Lacs did not "sharply limit'' or
overturn Klamath. 7 The Court in Mille Lacs merely held that when there was an express
recognition of off-reservation hunting and fishing rights, in one treaty, those expressly
recognized off-reservation rights would not be defeated by silence in a later treaty. Here, there
are no off-reservation rights of any kind recognized in any Agreement or Treaty for the Couer
d'Alene Tribe.
The United States and Tribe point only to a sentence in the 1873 Agreement to support
their claims. U.S. Resp. at 39; Tribe Resp. at 92 ("the waters running into said reservation shall
not be turned from their natural channel where they enter said reservation"). The Tribe asserts
that off-reservation instream flow rights were "locked in" in 1873 by this phrase, and concludes
that, since they did not subsequently cede the right to control off-reservation flows in either the
1887 or 1889 Agreements, the right to control instream flows persists today. Tribe Resp. at Part

III.CJ.

7

In fact, ODFW v. Klamath has been cited with approval by the Supreme Court in South Dakota v. Yankton Sioux
Tribe, 522 U.S. 329 ( 1998), another case affinning diminishment of a tribe's reservation by express language of
cession like that in the Coeur d'Alene Treaty, and again just last month in Wyoming v. EPA, 2017 WL 694481, _
F.3d _ (10th Cir. Feb.2017).
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Hecla discussed this language, in detail, in its prior briefing. See Hecla Resp. at Part
8

III.A. This language does not contemplate or imply any intent to control off-reservation
instream flows. Nothing in the (unratified) 1873 Agreement reserves any fishing rights or
biological needs of fish.
Even the most liberal reading of this language cannot support a conclusion that the
United States and Tribe intended to "lock in" off-reservation instream flows at 1873 levels
forever. This language is found in Article 1 of the 1873 Agreement - an Article exclusively
addressing the rights retained by the Tribe within the Reservation. 1873 Agreement at USACDA00021490. It is in this context, in this Article, that the Agreement states that "waters
running into said reservation shall not be turned from their natural channel where they enter

said reservation." Id. (emphasis added). There is no attempt here to identify or imply any right
to control off-reservation waterways. Indeed, where the waters "enter said reservation" is
different from all the off-reservation, instream flow locations claimed by the United States. It is
not until Article 2 that the United States and Tribe address the off-reservation lands - confirming
that the Tribe "agrees to relinquish to the Government ... all of their rights and title in and to all
the lands heretofore claimed by them." Id. Had there been any intent by either the United States
or the Tribe to retain any rights outside of the Reservation, it would have been discussed in
Article 2. However, there was no such reservation and the Tribe agreed to cede "all right, title
and interest" outside of the Reservation.
The United States and Tribe contend that their claims are different from the Nez Perce'
claims because they are based on a "biological necessity rather than any assertion of fishing
rights on off-reservation lands" and are "necessary to sustain the biological life cycles of the

8
That argument is incorporated herein as further discussion of the error in the United States' and Tribe's reliance on
this language.
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adfluvial fishery." US. Resp. at 66 & 76. Not true. The United States claimed that a water was
necessary because "fish need water" support the treaty right to fish off the Reservation. The Nez

Perce Order rejected these claims to a water right when it recognized "the importance of the
anadromous fish runs to the Nez Perce,"9 but concluded that ''there is no legitimate basis from
which to infer that a water right is necessary to the preservation of the limited right." Nez Perce

Order at 37.
Also of importance in the Nez Perce Order was the lack of any evidence that either the
United States or the Nez Perce considered that instream flows would be necessary. Id. at 32·33
("The parties to the J855 Nez Perce Treaty did not intend to reserve an instream flow water right
because neither party to the Treaty contemplated a problem would arise in the future pertaining
to fish habitat"). There is no evidence here that the United States and Tribe ever considered a

need to protect off-reservation instream flows for fish habitat or "biological" needs. Neither the
United States nor the Tribe point to any such evidence - because none exists. Merely asserting
that fishing had been important does not equate to a right to control the water resources to protect
fish habitat. Id. at 32 (recognizing that "the importance of the anadromous fish runs to the Nez
Perce could not have been of greater significance than it was to the 'fish eaters' west of the
Cascades" and determining that, notwithstanding this importance, there was no reservation of an
instream flow right to protect fish habitat).
The Agreements did not reserve flows for fish habitat. There is no discussion of fish
habitat. The Agreements do not establish any standards or identify any locations for fish habitat
The mere claim that fishing may have been important to the Tribe does not mandate an
implication that they intended to control the rivers. In light of the Tribe's agreement to give up

9
Similar to the adtluvial fish runs referenced by the United States, U.S. Resp. at 66, n.23, an anadromous fish run
consists of fish migrating up and down rivers from the ocean to spawn.
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all "right, title and claim" to those off-reservation lands, the Tribe has no reserved right to
instream flows. See Nez Perce Order at 37 {"Based on the scope of the Nez Perce fishing right,
there is no legitimate basis from which to infer that a water right is necessary to the preservation
of that limited right. The Nez Perce do not have anything akin to a fish propagation right.").
The Tribe asserts that Hecla "limits" the Tribe's instream flow rights to locales where the
Tribe has fishing rights. Tribe Resp., p. 71, n. 21. The Tribe miswiderstands Hecla's brief and
this Court's Nez Perce Order. First, Hecla does not agree that the Tribe has any water rights for
fish habitat, on or off the Reservation. Hecla's motion was addressed to the off-reservation
claims because that is where Hecla's rights are located. But Hecla has never agreed that the
Tribe has an on-reservation habitat/biological water right. The Treaty reserves no such right to
the Tribe and a claim to such a right does not withstand scrutiny under the Nez Perce Order.
Second, the Tribe misunderstands the Nez Perce proceedings. The United States and Nez Perce
Tribe did make Winters claims. This Court held that off-reservation water right claims for fish
based on the treaty right to fish and for fish habitat should be analyzed as an express treaty right
rather than an implied reserved water right. Order, p. 25. Neither approach works to give the
Coeur d'Alene Tribe an off-reservation water right here, because there is no express treaty
language reserving off-reservation fishing rights and the primary purpose of this reservation does
not require water for off-reservation fish habitat.
B.

A Primary Purpose of the Reservation was to Provide Additional Lands for
Settlement and Development, as Promoted by Federal Laws Which Also
Protected the Rights of Settlers to the Water Resources Necessary for that
Development.

The Nez Perce Order also confirmed that the intention of both the United States and
Tribe - relative to lands outside of the Reservation - is just as important as the intention in
establishing the Reservation. In rejecting the Nez Perce's instream flow claims, the SRBA Court
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also found it "inconceivable" that the United States and Nez Perce would have intended to
reserve instream flows - when viewed in light of the actions of the United States outside of the
Nez Perce Reservation.
The purpose of the Stevens Treaties [including the Nez Perce Treaty] was to
resolve the conflict which arose between the Indians and the non-Indian
settlers as a result of the Oregon Donation Act of 1850 which vested title to
land in settlers. It is inconceivable that the United States would have intended
or otherwise agreed to allow the Nez Perce to reserve instream flow offreservation water rights appurtenant to lands intended to be developed and
irrigated by non-Indian settlers.... it defies reason to imply the existence of a
water right that was both never intended by the parties and inconsistent with
the purpose of the Treaty."

Nez Perce Order at 38.
The history of opening the ceded lands in North Idaho is basically the same here. In 1866
- before any agreement was reached with the Tribe - the United States opened public lands to
mineral development, protecting necessary water rights associated therewith. Act of July 26,
1866, 14 Stat. 253 (codified at 50 U.S.C. §§ 51, 52 and 43 U.S.C. § 661). An 1870 amendment to
the Mining Act confirmed the recognition and protection of water rights associated with mineral
development. Act of July 9, 1870, 16 Stat. 218 (codified at 43 U.S.C. § 661). In 1877, Congress
passed the Desert Lands Act, authorizing persons to enter and claim irrigable lands "by
conducting water upon the same." Act of March 3, 1877 (codified at 43, U.S.C. § 321).
Examples of the important role that water played in the Coeur d'Alene Mining District
can be found in the earliest decisions of the Idaho courts. See Hawkins v. Spokane Hydraulic
Mine Co., 2 Idaho 970, 28 P. 433 (1891) (placer claim in the Coeur d'Alene mining district

worked with "a large stream of water" ... pipes, flumes and other hydraulic machinery); Idaho
Constitution, Art. XV§ 3 (recognizing priority of use of water in organized water districts).
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These statutes and this history fonns the backdrop of the negotiations with the Tribe. 10 As
settlers began to move into the Tribe's aboriginal lands for mineral and other development encouraged, no doubt, by the statutes authorizing mineral development and settlement on public
lands - the Tribe became concerned and "pushed" for a reservation. United States v. Idaho, 533
U.S. 262,267 (2001) ("Idaho Ill') ("In the 1880's, the Tribe became concerned with the mineral
development interfering with its lands and pushed for negotiations to establish a reservation").
Following the original Agreements, Congress authorized further negotiations with the Tribe after
receiving more pressure to open additional land for mineral development. United States v. Idaho,
210 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2000) ("Idaho If'). It is "inconceivable" that the United States and Tribe
would recognize this development, negotiate a reservation so that this development could
continue and, at the same time, retain instream flow rights that would prevent the use of the
water resources that would have been necessary for that very development.
The United States and Tribe dismiss this history and this legislation - contending that it
does not impact their ability to impose an environmental servitude on off-reservation waters and
water users. U.S. Resp. at 76-79; Tribe Resp. at 89-90. The United States accuses the State of
interpreting this legislation as setting "aside the entirety of waterbodies on public lands for only
private appropriation." U.S. Resp. at 77. The Tribe accuses Hecla of arguing that these statutes
"intended water on the public domain to be available solely for private appropriation" and that
"in order to effectuate these statutes, settlers and miners must have the unquestioned and

10

Equally important is what was happening on the ground. As one prominent western historian, Herbert Howe
_Bancroft, famously observed:
"The miners of Idaho were like quicksilver. A mass of them dropped in on any locality, broke up
into individual globules, and ran off after any atom of gold in their vicinity."
Bancroft, Works XXXI, p. 427. Quoted in R. Paul, Mining Frontiers of the Far West. 1848-1880, p. 139 (1963).
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absolute right to remove every drop of water from any stream on the public domain." Tribe Resp.
at 89-90. 11
The United States and Tribe muddle the issue. It is the United States and Tribe who want
the water for fish habitat. They do not even attempt to explain how the United States intended to
reserve this water for fish habitat on ceded lands and at the same time encourage mineral
development on the same ceded lands. A principal purpose of this Reservation was to separate
the Tribe from the settlers developing the aboriginal lands as promoted by federal laws and
policies. Particularly given the silence on fishing and water rights, there is simply no evidence
that in establishing this Reservation the United States and Tribe intended to impose an
environmental servitude on off-reservation waters and water users to protect fish habitat. Such a
contention is "inconceivable."

It "defies logic" to conclude that the United States would (i) pass legislation promoting
mineral and agricultural development - including in areas ceded by the Tribe; (ii) negotiate with
the Tribe for a reservation that specifically opened up lands for mineral development; and (iii)
mandate further negotiations in response to pressure to open even more lands for mineral
development, while, at the same time, threatening that very development through the imposition
of instream flows, such as those demanded by the Tribe. 12
Congress "had the sophistication and experience to use express language" to accomplish
its intended purposes. Mille Lacs, 526 U.S. at 185. In this case, the Agreements specifically and

11 Arguments such as these are breathless hyperbole. There is no basis in fact for this claim. Hecla's water rights do
not even come close to commanding "an absolute right to remove every drop of water from the stream." See, e.g..
Water Right Nos.94-2022, 94-2030, 94-2073, 94-2122.
12
The Tribe contends that Hecla has not provided evidence "that mineral ... development could not be maintained
along with a federal reserved water right that would ensure a minimum amount of water remains in the stream for
fish habitat." Tribe Re:ip. at 91. This is the United States' claim for the Tribe end it bears the burden of proof, not
Hecla. Yet, neither the United States nor the Tribe have provided any evidence that an off-reservation instream flow
right is necessary for the primary purpose of the reservation. Nor have they provided any evidence that the existing
instream flow rights held by the Idaho Water Resource Board are insufficient to protect fish habitat. See.for
example, Water Right Nos. 91-7122 (St. Joe River) & 94-7341 (Coeur d'Alene River).
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clearly evidenced an intent by the Tribe and by the United States to cede all "right, title and
claim" outside the Reservation. When viewed in light of the relevant history of settlement and
mineral development in this region, this language can only mean one thing - that the Tribe had
relinquished any "claim" it may have had outside the Reservation (including these claims for
instream flows). See Nez Perce Order at 38 ("it is inconceivable that the United States would
have intended or otherwise agreed to allow the [Tribe] to reserve instream flow off-reservation
water rights"); see United States v. Choctaw Nation, 179 U.S. 494, 532 (1900) ("It has never
been held that the obvious, palpable meaning of the words of an Indian treaty may be
disregarded because, in the opinion of the court, that meaning may in a particular transaction
work what it would regard as injustice to the Indians").

II.

Protection of Fish Habitat Was Not a Primary Purpose of the Reservation.

Winters, and its progeny, hold that a water right can only be reserved for the primary
purpose of the reservation at issue. The Winters Doctrine has been exercised only within the
narrowest boundaries and only when necessary to secure the "primary purpose" of the
reservation of land. Cappaert, 426 U.S. at 139 ("In determining whether there is a federally
reserved water right implicit in a federal reservation of public land, the issue is whether the
Government intended to reserve unappropriated and thus available water. Intent is inferred if the
previously unappropriated waters are necessary to accomplish the purposes/or which the
reservation was created.") (Emphasis added). Such claims must be "carefully examined" to

ensure that "only that amount of water necessary to fulfill the purpose of the reservation" is
recognized, "no more." New Mexico, 438 U.S. at 701. Water rights are reserved only for those
primary purposes of a reservation - any "secondary uses" may only be acquired ••in the same
manner as any other public or private appropriator." Id. at 699.
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The history of this Reservation fails to reveal that protection of off-reservation fish
habitat or off-reservation flows was a primary purpose of the Reservation. The undisputed
factual record clearly shows that the creation of the Reservation was spWTed, in large part, due to
the discovery of valuable mineral deposits within the aboriginal lands of the Tribe. Arrington A.ff.
Ex.Bat 104 ("The one thing that has given them [i.e. the Tribe] trouble has been the fear of
losing their homes. They have watched the progress of white settlement in the surrounding
county, the discovery of valuable mines, the building of railroads, etc. etc."); id. ("It was feared
in the early spring that the great rush to the Coeur d'Alene gold mines would cause considerable
trespassing upon their reserve"); see also Idaho v. United States, 533 U.S. 262,265 (2001)
("Idaho Ill') (the 1867 Reservation was set aside "in the face of immigration into the Tribe's

aboriginal territory").
Congress authorized negotiations with the Tribe to induce '4the tribes 'to abandon their
roaming habits and consent to confine themselves within the limits of such reservation or
reservations as may be designated for their occupancy."' United States v. Idaho, 95 F.Supp.2d
1094, 1095 (D. Idaho 1998) ("Idaho f'). In 1867, President Johnson issued an Executive Order
establishing a reservation. Idaho Ill at 265. When the Tribe discovered the 1867 Reservation, the
Tribe demanded a new Reservation boundary that "included key river valleys" because "'we are
not as yet quite up to living on farming' and 'for a while yet we need have some hunting and
fishing."' Id. at 266 (emphasis added). Following negotiations, the United States and Tribe
agreed, in 1873, on a Reservation that was comprised of approximately 590,000 acres. United

States v. Idaho, 210 F.3d 1067 (9th Cir 2000) ("Idaho If'); Idaho Ill, 533 U.S. at 266 ("Following
further negotiations, the Tribe in 1873 agreed to relinquish (for compensation) all claims to its
aboriginal lands outside the bounds of a more substantial reservation that negotiators for the
United States agreed to set apart and secure" "'for the exclusive use of the Coeur d'Alene Indians,
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and to protect ... from settlement or occupancy by other persons"). Outside the Reservation, the
Tribe agreed to cede all ••right, title and claim." Id. Nothing in the Executive Order identified
fishing or fish habitat (whether on or off-reservation) as a purpose of the Reservation. See Supra
Part I.
The 1873 Agreement required approval from Congress '"before it became binding on the
parties," but it was never ratified. Idaho III at 266-67. In 1885, recognizing that no formal
agreement was in place, the Tribe, due to their concerns about white settlement pressure,
petitioned the Government and requested further treaty negotiations. Idaho Ill, supra at 267
("make with us a proper treaty"); see also Arrington Dec. Ex. A (Non-Indian interest in forest
lands of northern Idaho predated the l 880s, but accelerated with the emergence of mining towns
along the South Fork of the Coeur d'Alene River). Seeking to ..extinguish the Tribe's aboriginal
title to lands outside of the reservation," Congress authorized additional negotiations in 1887.

Idaho III, 533 U.S. at 267.
The Reservation identified in the 1873 and 1887 agreements included "the vast majority
of the Lake" and valuable mineral deposits in the area. Idaho II at 1070; Idaho III, 533 U.S. at
268 ("the reservation appears to embrace all the navigable waters of Lake Coeur d'Alene, except
a very small fragment"). While the 1887 agreement was pending before Congress, the United
States received '"pressure to open up at least part of the reservation to the public (particularly the
Lake)" to develop its timber and mineral deposits. Idaho II at 1070; Arrington A.If. Ex.Bat 106
('"There is great eagerness on the part of the whites to locate mining claims on the mineral
portion of the reserve ... and we found mining claims numerously staked off ... and in some
cases notices posted''); id. at I 06-07 ("These mining prospectors are constantly on this portion of
the reserve, and it seems next to impossible to keep them off"). These mineral deposits had little
value to the Tribe. See Id. at 106; but see Idaho III, 533 U.S. at 269 (The ..northern end of said
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reservation, is valuable and necessary to the citizens of the United States for sundry reasons"
including that "It contains numerous, extensive, and valuable mineral ledges"). In fact, Congress
authorized the Commissioners to acquire new lands "with few limitations aside from an
instruction to acquire non-agricultural lands". Idaho II at 1077.
In 1889, following further negotiations, the Tribe agreed to "cede the approximate
northern third of its 1873 reservation to the United States" - including the land containing the
valuable mineral deposits desired by the white settlers. Idaho IL supra; see also Arrington A.ff.
Ex. C ("The commissioners report that they held frequent councils with the Indians, explored the
mineral portions of the reservation lying in the northern part thereof, and finally on September 9,
1889, concluded an agreement with the Indians whereby they cede and relinquish to the United
States a very considerable portion of their reservation, valuable chiefly for mineral and timber
upon terms advantageous as they believe to the Indians and the Government"). Clearly, a
primary purpose of the Reservation was to open mineral deposits on the ceded land to
dev~lopment, which federal law recognized requires water. 1866 Mining Act, supra.
The Tribe pins its claim to a water right because it disagreed with the 1867 Reservation
due, at least in part. to the lack of waterways within the Reservation boundaries of that Executive
Order. The United States and Tribe advance this argument as "evidence" that the "primary
purpose" of the Reservation must have been to protect fish habitat. Yet, getting waterways within
the boundary of the Reservation would not have been important, if as the United States and Tribe
now claim, their rights to flow and fish habitat were fully protected off the Reservation. Their
arguments cannot withstand scrutiny.
The historical record demonstrates:
1. The formation of the Reservation was spurred, in large part, by the encroachment
of settlers on the Tribe's aboriginal grounds; Idaho Ill, 533 U.S. at 26S (the 1867
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Reservation was set aside "in the face of immigration into the Tribe's aboriginal
territory"); see also Idaho Ill, 533 U.S. at 269 (The "northern end of said
reservation. is valuable and necessary to the citizens of the United States for
sundry reasons'' including that ••it contains numerous, extensive, and valuable
mineral ledges"); Idaho II at l 077 (Congress authorized new negotiations in 1889
"with few limitations aside from an instruction to acquire non-agricultural
lands").
2. When the Tribe learned of the 1867 Reservation, it requested negotiations for a
larger Reservation. The Tribe recognized that ..primary purpose" of that
Reservation was to allow the Tribe to transition to a more agrarian lifestyle and
would only need fishing and hunting "for a while." Idaho Ill, at 266 ("'we are not
as yet quite up to living on farming' and 'for a while yet we need have some
hunting and fishing"').
3. The 1873 Agreement does not provide any express reservation of off-reservation
instream flows or off-reservation hunting or fishing rights. There is no discussion
of fishing, fish habitat or fish levels. Indeed, the 1873 Agreement is wholly silent
on fishing, fishing rights and guaranteed water supplies. 1873 Agreement at USACDA00021490. To the contrary, the 1873 Agreement recognizes the agrarian
lifestyle purpose of the Agreement by providing wagons, cross cut saws and other
similar items to the Tribe. Id. Further, through the 1873 Agreement, the Tribe
agreed to cede ••a11 right, title and claim" outside the Reservation.
4. The 1887 Agreement does not reserve any water rights, fishing or fish habitat. Act
of March 3, 1891. In the 1887 Agreement, the Tribe agreed to cede "all right, title
and claim" outside the Reservation. Id.
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5. In 1888, Congress authorized further negotiations with the Tribe to acquire new
lands ''with few limitations aside from an instruction to acquire non-agricultural
lands." Idaho IL supra at 1077
6. The 1889 Agreement does not reserve any water rights, fishing or fish habitat. Act

of March 3, 1891. In the 1889 Agreement, the Tribe agreed to cede "all right, title
and claim" outside the Reservation. Id.
7. The 1891 Congressional ratification of the Reservation Agreements does not

reserve any water rights, fishing or fish habitat. Id. The 1891 authorization
recognized the Tribe's agreement to cede "all right, title and claim" outside the
Reservation. Id.
A water right is reserved only if the primary and specific purposes of the Reservation
would be entirely defeated. United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696, 701 (1975). These facts
present a clear picture of the purpose of the Reservation. The Tribe would not have stated that
"'we are not as yet quite up to living on fanning' and 'for a while yet we need have some
hunting and fishing/" Idaho III at 266, if the purpose of the Reservation was the protection of
fish habitat forever, particularly the off-reservation rights at issue in Hecla's motion. The use of
phrases such as "not as yet," "for a while" and "some hunting and fishing" evidence a clear
picture of Tribe's understanding of the intent of the Reservation. While hunting and fishing may
have been a part of the Tribe's aboriginal lifestyle, the purpose of the Reservation was to
transition the Tribal members to a more agrarian lifestyle. This purpose does not "envision
access to water" for off-reservation instream flows.
When the Tribe ceded all "right, title and claim" outside the boundaries, the Reservation
was legally diminished and no off-reservation rights remained. South Dakota v. Yankton Sioux
Tribe, 522 U.S. 329 (1998); Wyoming v. EPA, 2017 WL 694481 (10th Cir. Feb. 22, 2017). Their
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claim to have silently reserved these rights is inconsistent with the diminishment law from the
Supreme Court.

CONCLUSION
The Reservation was not established to protect off-reservation fish habitat. The specific
and stated purposes of the Reservation were to (l) allow for the development of aboriginal ceded
lands by settlers. and (2) allow the Tribe to transition to an agrarian lifestyle on the Reservation.
Outside the Reservation, the Tribe ceded all "right, title and claim" - retaining no rights on the
ceded lands. Recognizing off-reservation instream flow claims puts at risk the rights of
thousands of people who relied on the United States' actions in opening these lands to settlement
and mineral development. Hecla's summary judgment motion should be granted.
DATED this 20th day of March, 2017.
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